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I. Introduction 
Traditional analysis of determinants of capital structure has focused on firm 
characteristics mainly related to the extent of agency costs and asymmetric information 
(Jensen, 1986; Harris and Raviv, 1991).These studies have generally analyzed samples 
of US companies by comparing the trade-off theory (TOT) with the pecking order 
theory (POT). Recent papers argue that capital structure is affected not only by firm-
level variables, but also by country-level variables, or a firm’s legal and institutional 
environment.1 We add to this growing literature. Our main contributions are analysis of: 
1) how the determinants of firm leverage vary across countries depending on bank 
concentration and the legal and institutional system, and 2) how bank concentration 
interacts with the legal and institutional system to address conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and debtholders. This analysis lets us to examine the different validity of 
the TOT and POT across countries. 
Empirical literature suggests that an effective legal system favors a firm’s use of 
external funds, while companies in poorer contracting environments depend more on 
internal funds (Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Qian and Strahan, 2007). A 
well-developed legal system affects not only the extent of external funding but also 
increases the proportion of long-term debt (Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; 
Giannetti, 2003; Fan et al., 2006). 
                                                 
1 Secure property rights are associated with higher stock market values and a higher number of listed 
firms (La Porta et al., 1997), higher valuation of listed firms relative to their assets (Claessens et al., 
2002; La Porta et al., 2002), greater use of external finance (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2000), greater 
investments from external funds (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998), and 
higher improvements in performance of privatized firms (D’Souza et al., 2005; Boubakri et al., 2005). 
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Most international studies in this area of research use country-level data. Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Booth et al. (2001), Giannetti (2003), and Fan et al. (2006) use firm-
level data for cross-country comparisons of capital structure. Bae and Goyal (2004) and 
Qian and Strahan (2007) also analyze how country variables affect the characteristics of 
bank loans. 
These papers offer mixed evidence on the influence of institutions on firm capital 
structure. Rajan and Zingales (1995) in an analysis of large listed companies in G-7 
countries find that factors identified as cross-sectionally correlated with firm leverage in 
the United States are similarly correlated in other countries as well. Booth et al. (2001) 
suggest that the same determinants of capital structure prevail in ten developing 
countries. This research together suggests that institutional differences are unimportant 
in both developed and developing countries, although the authors compare separate 
regressions for each country and do not use explicit variables for the institutional 
environment in their estimations. 
Giannetti (2003) explicitly introduces creditor right protection in the analysis of a 
sample of listed and unlisted companies in eight European countries. Her results suggest 
that the relevance of institutional variables depends on firm size. Larger listed 
companies have easier access to international financial markets, so their corporate 
finance decisions are less subject to the institutional constraints in domestic markets. 
Institutional characteristics, however, have a greater impact in unlisted companies. For 
these companies, stronger creditor protection makes loans for investing in intangible 
assets more available and guarantees access to long-term debt for firms in sectors with 
highly volatile returns. Fan et al. (2006) find that institutional factors are critical 
determinants of firm capital structure in a cross-section of 39 developed and developing 
countries. A country’s legal and tax system, level of corruption, and the availability of 
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information intermediaries explain a significant portion of the cross-country variation in 
leverage. Firms in common law countries, for example, have less leverage and use more 
long-term debt. 
Finally, Bae and Goyal (2004) and Qian and Strahan (2007) show the relevance of 
institutional conditions for terms of bank loans. Bae and Goyal (2004) find lenders 
charge lower spreads on loans in countries with stronger property rights protection, 
while the latter find that stronger creditor rights enhanced loan availability. 
Our work makes several contributions to this literature. First, we analyze the influence 
of bank concentration and institutional characteristics not only on firm leverage but also 
on the firm-level determinants of leverage. Our analysis shows that either the pecking 
order or trade-off theories apply differently across countries, depending on institutions 
and bank concentration. Weaker protection of property rights increases the agency cost 
of external funds, leading to the preferential use of internal funds as posited by the POT. 
The TOT, however, is more valid in countries with stronger protection of property 
rights. 
Second, we analyze the interaction of bank concentration with a country’s legal and 
institutional system (protection of property and creditor rights) to reduce agency costs 
and mitigate information asymmetries between shareholders and debtholders. The 
results suggest that greater bank concentration can substitute for creditor protection and 
asset tangibility to reduce the agency cost of debt. 
Third, we analyze more countries than most previous studies. We include a sample of 
12,049 firms in 39 countries over the period 1995-2004 (the same number of countries 
as Fan et al., 2006), compared to seven countries in Rajan and Zingales (1995), eight 
countries in Giannetti (2003), and ten in Booth et al. (2001). We thus can provide 
information on a greater range of institutional differences to give us a deeper 
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understanding of how capital structure depends on institutions and on bank 
concentration. 
Finally, we account for dynamic processes in firm leverage using generalized-method-
of-moments (GMM) estimators developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for dynamic 
panel data. GMM models are designed to handle autoregressive properties in the 
dependent variable (firm leverage) when lagged values are included as explanatory 
variables and endogeneity in the explanatory variables (other firm-specific 
characteristics) must be controlled for. Although the GMM method has been used in 
studies on capital structure focusing on a single country, it has not yet been applied in 
studies using international data.2 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the influence of bank 
concentration and institutions on the determinants of firm capital structure and the 
hypotheses tested in the paper. Section 3 describes the characteristics of the database 
and methodology, while Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 checks the 
robustness of our basic results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
II. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
There are two competing but not mutually exclusive financial models based on firm 
variables to explain financing decisions: trade-off theory (TOT) and pecking order 
theory (POT). The TOT posits that firms maximize their value when the benefits of debt 
(the tax shield, its disciplinary role or the reduction of free cash flow problems and its 
advantage over outside equity in terms of information costs) equal the marginal cost of 
debt (bankruptcy costs and agency costs between shareholders and debtholders). 
                                                 
2Cheung and Wei (2006) point out that omitting adjustment costs in the model specification biases the 
analysis of the relation between insider ownership and corporate performance. Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999), Fama and French (2002), and Flannery and Rangan (2006), among others, obtain results 
consistent with partial adjustment to the target leverage. 
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The POT, developed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), focuses on the 
information asymmetries between firm insiders and outsiders. It assumes managers use 
private information to issue risky securities when the firm is overvalued. Investors are 
aware of this asymmetric information problem, and they discount the price of a firm’s 
new and already issued risky securities when new issues are announced. Managers 
anticipate these price discounts, and may forgo profitable investments if they must 
finance them with new risky securities. To avoid this distortion of investment decisions, 
managers prefer to finance projects with retained earnings which do not involve the 
asymmetric information problem associated with risky debt. Without enough retained 
earnings, they will use debt financing; an equity issue would be the least favored option. 
This means that changes in a firm’s leverage are driven not by the costs and benefits of 
debt according to the trade-off model, but rather by the firm’s net cash flows (cash 
earnings minus investment outlays) and the degree of information asymmetry. 
Table 1 summarizes the traditional arguments of the POT and the TOT for the effects of 
these firm characteristics on leverage (Myers, 1977; Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995; Flannery and Rangan, 2006). The POT model suggests that a firm’s 
debt drops with profitability but increases with growth opportunities and intangible 
assets. The TOT, on the other hand, suggests that a firm’s debt rises with profitability 
and drops with growth opportunities and intangible assets. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We argue that the TOT or POT may apply differently across countries as the 
information asymmetries and agency costs vary depending on the quality of a country’s 
legal and institutional system (protection of property rights and creditor rights) and on 
its bank market concentration.  
a) Property rights 
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Weak protection of property rights means investors are less likely to enter into private 
contracts, which makes information asymmetry more relevant, increasing problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard. As equity issue is subject to more problems of 
information asymmetry than debt, we would expect stronger protection of property 
rights to favor increased use of equity over debt. 
This prediction is consistent with the empirical literature suggesting that weak legal 
systems and poor institutional infrastructure impede market functioning. La Porta et al. 
(1997, 1998) find that markets develop better in countries that protect the rights of 
minority shareholders. Levine (1998, 1999) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that 
bank-based architecture survives and is more effective in countries with weaker legal 
and institutional systems because banks, in the absence of effective legal provision, 
have enough power to protect their interests. Hence, market-based systems work better 
and equity issues may be more frequent in a more protective contractual environment. 
The first hypothesis is: 
H.1: Better protection of property rights favors the issue of equity and is, therefore, 
negatively related to firm leverage. 
The protection of property rights may also affect firm-level determinants of capital 
structure. In a poor contracting environment, where investors cannot solve the conflicts 
of interest associated with information asymmetries, firms are more likely to favor the 
use of internal funds as it is more difficult for them to use external funds. In countries 
with poor contracting environments, we would therefore expect the POT arguments to 
prevail. In these countries firm leverage would be more negatively (less positively) 
related to profitability and asset tangibility but more positively (less negatively) related 
to growth opportunities. 
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In countries with a better contracting environment, however, the enforceability of 
contracts would allow counterparties themselves to resolve conflicts stemming from 
information asymmetry. Nonetheless, there would always be unresolved conflicts 
within the incomplete contracts framework. The intensity of these would depend on the 
characteristics of the particular firms. Companies with more tangible assets could offer 
greater guarantees to reduce the cost of debt and could borrow more than firms with 
fewer tangible assets. In countries with better contracting environments, we would 
therefore expect the TOT arguments to prevail. 
According to this argument, the second hypothesis is: 
H.2: The TOT (POT) is better able (less able) to explain the determinants of firm 
leverage with a country’s protection of property rights. 
 
b) Creditor rights 
We include a creditor rights index to see whether differences in firm leverage across 
countries are associated with differences in the legal protection of creditors. Empirical 
evidence suggests a positive relation between the protection of creditors and firm debt. 
Levine (1998, 1999) uses country-level data to find that banks develop better in 
countries that better protect the rights of secured creditors. Giannetti (2003) reports that 
unlisted firms investing in intangible assets in countries with good creditor protection 
find it easier to obtain loans. Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Giannetti 
(2003) show that institutions that favor creditor rights and ensure stricter enforcement 
are associated not only with higher leverage but also with wider availability of long-
term debt. Qian and Strahan (2007) find that strong creditor protection is associated 
with longer-term lending and lower interest rates. 
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The protection of creditor rights may also affect firm-level determinants of capital 
structure. When creditors are not sufficiently protected by law, it will be harder for 
firms with higher agency cost of debt to get a loan because banks anticipate, all else 
equal, more problems of underinvestment and risk-shifting. Better protection of creditor 
rights may mitigate these conflicts and thereby improve access to credit for firms 
investing in intangible assets, with low profitability, and high growth opportunities. 
Thus, we expect the trade-off theory to be less valid in countries with better protection 
of creditor rights. Evidence consistent with the greater availability of debt for firms 
investing in intangible assets is found by Giannetti (2003) in countries with good 
protection of creditor rights. 
The third hypothesis is: 
H.3: The TOT is less able to explain the determinants of firm leverage with a country’s 
protection of creditor rights.  
 
c) Bank market concentration 
The banking literature suggests two possibly opposing effects of bank concentration on 
firm leverage. In a market without information asymmetries, where agents have perfect 
information on the quality of goods being exchanged, market power results in a higher 
price for credit and less credit availability. Following this argument, a negative relation 
might be expected between bank concentration and firm leverage. 
In markets with asymmetric information, however, higher bank market concentration 
may increase incentives of banks to invest in the acquisition of soft information by 
establishing close relationships with borrowers over time (relationship banking), 
facilitating the availability of credit, thereby reducing firms’ financial constraints (Boot, 
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2000; Dell’Aricia and Marquez, 2004). The importance of bank concentration in 
determining the value of lending relationships was first articulated by Petersen and 
Rajan (1994, 1995). They offer evidence from small business data indicating that 
creditors are more likely to finance credit-constrained firms when credit markets are 
concentrated because it is easier for these creditors to internalize the benefits of 
assisting the firms. They also show that building close ties with an institutional creditor 
is valuable for firms and appears to operate more through quantities rather than prices. 
Following this argument, a positive relation would be expected between bank market 
concentration and firm leverage. 
Empirical evidence on the influence of bank concentration on debt availability is mixed. 
Like Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995), Berlin and Mester (1999) show in the US that 
firms in less concentrated credit markets are subject to greater financial constraints. 
However, D’Auria et al. (1999) in Italy and Degryse and Ongena (2005) in Belgium 
find that greater bank market concentration raises the cost of bank financing. Cetorelli 
and Gambera (2001) also provide mixed evidence on the effect of bank concentration 
on economic growth. While it generally has a negative effect on growth, it also 
promotes growth of industrial sectors that are more in need of external finance by 
facilitating credit access for younger firms. The opposing arguments and mixed 
empirical evidence mean that the influence of bank market concentration on firm 
leverage is basically an empirical question. 
We contribute to this literature by analyzing how the influence of bank concentration on 
firm leverage may vary with a country’s legal and institutional environment. Our 
hypothesis is that the positive effect of bank concentration on firm’s leverage, suggested 
by relationship banking, may be greater in countries with less stringent protection of 
property and creditor rights. The difficulty for development of markets in such 
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environments may promote long-term relationships between banks and debtors (La 
Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Bank concentration in these markets may favor these 
relationships and have a positive effect on firm debt. Bank concentration in 
underdeveloped markets may therefore substitute good legal protection of creditors and 
property and operate in the absence of strong institutions to reduce information 
asymmetries and agency costs between banks and firm owners. In developed markets, 
however, private contracting conflicts may be solved by smooth functioning 
institutions, and concentration is no longer useful for promoting the long-term 
relationships that then become less beneficial. 
Following this argument, we establish the fourth hypothesis: 
H.4: Bank concentration has a more positive effect (or a less negative effect) on firm 
leverage in countries with less developed legal and institutional environments. 
 
Bank concentration may also influence firm-level determinants of leverage. We expect 
higher bank concentration to reduce the importance of pecking order theory arguments 
by mitigating problems of information asymmetry between firms and bank lenders. 
Reduced information asymmetries make it easier for less profitable firms with fewer 
tangible assets to use debt. Higher bank concentration and long-term relationships 
between banks and debtholders would also make the trade-off theory less valid by 
reducing agency costs. Lower agency costs make firms’ profitability and tangibility less 
important in facilitating access to debt. As we expect higher concentration to reduce the 
validity of both the POT and the TOT, we cannot make a clear forecast for the influence 
of bank concentration on the traditional firm-level determinants of debt, and therefore 
we analyze it as an empirical question. 
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III. Econometric specification and database 
A. Methodology 
We adopt the traditional dynamic model of capital structure that researchers have used 
in prior studies of a single country. The model tests whether there is a leverage target 
and, if so, how quickly a firm moves toward the target. The form of the target 
adjustment model states that changes in the debt ratio (Dit – Dit-1) partially absorb the 
difference between the target leverage (Dit*) and lagged leverage (Dit-1):  
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where the transaction costs that impede complete adjustment to the target leverage are 
measured by the coefficient , which varies between 0 and 1 and is inversely related to 
adjustment costs. If transaction costs are zero, i.e.,  = 1, Dit = Dit*, and firms 
automatically adjust their debt level to the target level. So, firm leverage is: 
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As the target debt is unobservable, we model it as a linear function of the traditional 
determinants of capital structure as indicated by Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
(profitability, growth opportunities, tangible assets, and size), obtaining:3 
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3 Other authors using this framework include Miguel and Pindado (2001), Ozkan (2001), Gaud et al. 
(2005), and Flannery and Rangan (2006). 
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In addition to firm-level variables, we also included bank market concentration 
(CONC), protection of property rights (RIGHTS), and protection of creditor rights 
(CREDITORS) in each country. k
m
k
C
1
 is the set of country dummy variables 
controlling for other legal and institutional aspects beyond those explicitly included in 
RIGHTS and CREDITORS. t
t
Y

2004
1995
 is a set of dummy time variables for each year 
capturing any unobserved firm-invariant time effect not included in the regression. We 
also include industry dummy variables according to SIC code ( j
n
j
I
1
) to capture any 
industry effect not included in the explanatory variables. i  is the firm effect, which is 
assumed to be constant for firm i over t; and it is the error term. 
We apply generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) estimators developed for dynamic 
models of panel data by Arellano and Bond (1991). This methodology is specifically 
designed to address three particular econometric issues: (i) the presence of unobserved 
firm-specific effects, eliminated by taking first differences of the variables; (ii) the 
autoregressive process in the data regarding the behavior of the leverage ratio (i.e., the 
need to use a lagged-dependent-variables model to capture the dynamic nature of the 
capital structure decisions); and (iii) the likely endogeneity of the explanatory variables. 
We control for the potential endogeneity of PROF, GROWTH, PPE, and SIZE in the 
GMM estimations by using two- to four-period lags of the same variables as 
instruments. The country and the dummy variables are initially considered exogenous. 
We check later to see that results do not change when we consider the potential 
endogeneity of the legal and institutional variables. 
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We use one-step estimation and specify the robust estimator of the variance-covariance 
matrix of the parameters. We also examine the hypothesis that there is no second-order 
serial correlation in the first-difference residuals (m2). In our models this hypothesis of 
the absence of second-order serial correlation is not rejected. First-order serial 
correlation (m1) in the differentiated residuals is attributable to the first difference of 
models. 
B. Database 
We obtain firm balance-sheet and income-statement annual data (in euros and in real 
prices) from Worldscope for 1995-2004. We initially selected the 49 countries 
considered by La Porta et al. (1998), but then eliminated 10 of them because of scarce 
data: Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. The final number of countries considered is therefore 39, 
including both developed and developing countries. 
We exclude firms whose capital decisions may reflect special factors: the financial 
industry (SIC codes 6000 – 6999) and regulated enterprises (SIC codes 4000 – 4999). 
Since we apply the GMM first-difference estimator with one lag of the dependent 
variable in the empirical analysis, firms with fewer than three consecutive years of data 
must be excluded. There are ultimately 12,049 firms included in the sample and 59,577 
firm-year observations.  
Following Titman and Wessels (1988), Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), and 
Booth et al. (2001), our proxy for leverage is the ratio between long-term debt and the 
market value of assets.4 Market value of assets is defined as total assets minus book 
                                                 
4 Welch (2004) argues that we should use market leverage ratios since our theories of target ratios are 
implicitly about market leverage ratios. Many other researchers analyze market value debt ratios, such as 
Hovakimian et al. (2001), Fama and French (2002), Barclay et al. (2003), Leary and Roberts (2005), and 
Flannery and Rangan (2006). 
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value of equity plus market value of equity. Long-term debt is the debt that is most 
sensitive to the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. By using it as a 
dependent variable, we aim to better understand the effect of bank concentration and 
institutions on the resolution of such problems between firms and debtholders. We 
check the robustness of the results using total debt. 
Profitability (PROF) is measured as earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation 
expenses and provisions (non-cash deductions from earnings) divided by total assets 
(Miguel and Pindado, 2001; Ozkan, 2001; Gaud et al., 2005). Following Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Gaud et al. (2005), and Flannery and Rangan (2006), we measure 
growth opportunities (GROWTH) as the market-to-book ratio. We proxy the tangibility 
of assets by the percentage of property, plant, and equipment in total assets (PPE). This 
variable is used by Titman and Wessels (1988) as an indicator that is positively related 
to the collateral value.  
Larger firms tend to be more diversified, and size may be an inverse proxy for the 
probability of bankruptcy. Many authors thus suggest that firm size is positively related 
to the leverage ratio (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Frank and Goyal, 
2003; Gaud et al., 2005). However, there are assumed to be fewer information 
asymmetries between insiders in a firm and the capital markets for larger firms. Large 
firms should thus be more able to issue informationally sensitive securities like equity, 
and should have less debt. We measure size by the natural logarithm of total sales 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Gaud et al., 2005).  
We follow Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2004) and Beck et al. (2006) and measure bank 
concentration as the fraction of bank assets held by the three largest commercial banks 
in the country. Figures are obtained from the World Bank Database, whose main source 
is Fitch IBCA’s Bankscope Database.  
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We measure the protection of property rights by the index of private property rights 
published by the Heritage Foundation. This is an annual indicator of the degree to 
which private property rights are protected and the degree to which the government 
enforces laws that protect private property. It also accounts for the possibility that 
private property may be expropriated, and analyzes the independence of the judiciary, 
corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce 
contracts. This index ranges between 1 and 5; a high score indicates greater legal 
protection of property (we reverse the scale of the original index). 
We use the index developed in La Porta et al. (1998) to measure a borrower country’s 
overall creditor rights. This index is equal to the sum of the scores (0 to 1) for five 
categories: no automatic stay on assets, payment of secured creditors first, restrictions 
on reorganization, restrictions on management during reorganization, and legal reserves 
required as a percentage of capital. This index thus ranges from 0 to 5, with higher 
values indicating stronger creditor rights or stronger protection against borrower 
expropriation. 
Table 2 shows for the total sample a mean leverage ratio of 15.33%, with an average 
profitability of 8.48% and a mean for growth opportunities of 2.67. The companies in 
the sample have a 32.63% ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets. Market 
leverage ratios vary considerably across countries from 26.15% in India to 7.62% in 
Turkey. 
Table 2 also presents mean values for CONC, RIGHTS, and CREDITORS. Bank 
concentration varies greatly across countries. In Finland and Sweden, three banks 
account for almost all bank assets. In countries such as the US or Taiwan, the 
percentage of bank assets held by the three largest commercial banks was less than 
30%. 
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(INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix. Long-term leverage and total leverage are highly 
correlated. According to most of the previous empirical evidence, debt ratios are 
positively correlated with firm size. A positive correlation of market long-term leverage 
with profitability and tangible assets and a negative correlation with growth 
opportunities are consistent with predictions of the trade-off theory. Moreover, country 
variables (CONC, RIGHTS, CREDITORS) are negatively correlated with the long-term 
debt ratio.  
(INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE) 
IV. Results 
Table 4 compares results obtained by Rajan and Zingales (1995) in the seven major 
industrialized countries and the results we obtain for these countries as we replicate 
their methodology and also apply the generalized method of moments. 
(INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE) 
Ordinary least squares results in our database agree those reported by Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), except for Germany, France, and Italy, for which Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) have fewer observations. Our estimations show that profitability has a negative 
influence on leverage in all countries, while tangibility and size have a positive effect. 
The market-to-book ratio has a negative coefficient in all countries, except in the US 
and France. Rajan and Zingales (1995) also showed growth has a negative influence on 
borrowing in these two countries. 
The greatest differences come from applying GMM instead of ordinary least squares. 
Although profitability continues to have a negative influence on debt, with the 
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exception of Italy, size, tangibility, and growth tend not to have a significant influence 
on the level of borrowing in the seven countries. This indicates differences resulting 
from the use of a partial-adjustment model where some of the variation in the dependent 
variable is absorbed by the lagged dependent variable. 
We also estimate Equation [4] separately for each country in order to analyze the 
stability of firm-level determinants across countries. Results in Table 5 indicate changes 
in the signs and significance of firm-level determinants of leverage across countries. 
The traditional negative relation between leverage and profitability found by Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Booth et al. (2001), and Giannetti (2003) is statistically significant in 
17 of the 39 countries. Growth has significant negative coefficients in only 7 countries 
and non-significant coefficients in the other countries. There is even more cross-country 
variation in signs in the estimated coefficients for asset tangibility. PPE in 16 of the 39 
countries has the traditional positive coefficient found in previous research, but a 
negative coefficient in three countries (Belgium, Italy, and Mexico); in 20 countries 
there are no significant coefficients. 
Variations across countries in the determinants of capital structure are consistent with 
the idea that country variables like bank concentration and the institutional environment 
are relevant for the level and determinants of debt. We analyze this possible relevance 
in Tables 6 through 8. 
(INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE) 
Table 6 shows the results of the partial-adjustment model [4] for the whole sample of 
firms. The coefficients of time, country, and industry dummies are not reported to save 
space. The positive and statistically significant coefficients of DEBTt-1 suggest that 
firms have a target leverage to which they partially adjust in each period. Coefficients of 
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DEBTt-1 take values of around 0.66, which implies values of  of approximately 0.34. 
This value is similar to those reported by Flannery and Rangan (2006), where the mean 
US firm converges toward its long-run target at a rate of 30% per year. 5 
(INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE) 
The relation between leverage and profitability of the firm is negative for all estimations 
in Table 6. This is the result most frequently found in the single-country regressions of 
Table 5 and is consistent with the pecking order theory because higher profitability 
increases the possibility of retaining earnings and reduces, all else being equal, the need 
for debt. 
Size has a positive impact on firms’ debt, which is consistent with size being an inverse 
proxy for the probability of bankruptcy. This result is similar to results shown in Rajan 
and Zingales (1995), Fama and French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2003), Flannery and 
Rangan (2006), and Gaud et al. (2005). 
Coefficients for growth opportunities and the tangibility of assets are not statistically 
significant at standard levels, although their signs are consistent with the traditional 
arguments of the trade-off theory. The negative coefficients for growth opportunities 
reflect higher agency costs between shareholders and debtholders and higher costs of 
financial distress. The positive coefficients of PPE in all the estimations seem to be 
consistent with the greater value of these assets as collateral.  
Like other authors who have tested TOT and POT, in this international sample we do 
not find results that validate the predominance of one theory over the other; that is, the 
results are partially consistent with both theories.6 
                                                 
5 Jalivand and Harris (1984), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), and Flannery and Rangan (2006) find 
values of  ranging between 0.30 and 0.70 for the US; Kremp et al. (1999) find a value of 0.53 for 
German firms and a value of 0.28 for France; Ozkan (2001) finds values between 0.52 and 0.57 for a 
panel data set of UK companies; Miguel and Pindado (2001) find an  of 0.79 for a panel data set for 
Spanish companies; and Gaud et al. (2005) finds values of between 0.14 and 0.29 for the Swiss market.  
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The influence of bank concentration on debt ratio is positive, consistent with evidence 
initially provided by Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) in support of the fact that 
concentrated credit markets make lending relationships more valuable and thus improve 
access to loans. 
The variable proxying for the protection of property rights has negative coefficients in 
all estimations. This result is consistent with our hypothesis H.1 and with lower agency 
costs associated with equity issues in countries with stronger protection of property 
rights. This result complements the evidence provided by Bae and Goyal (2004) to the 
effect that stronger protection of property rights reduces loan spreads in international 
bank loans. Our finding suggests that protection of property rights has a more positive 
influence on equity than on debt. This conclusion is consistent with the higher leverage 
and shorter debt maturity found by Fan et al. (2006) in countries with high levels of 
corruption. 
The positive coefficients for CREDITORS in columns (5) and (6) confirm that legal 
protection of creditor rights can reduce the agency cost of debt, as documented by 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Giannetti (2003). Our result is also 
consistent with the lower interest rates and longer maturities of bank loans found by 
Qian and Strahan (2007) in countries with strong legal protection of creditors. 
A. Interaction of bank concentration with the legal and institutional environment 
To analyze whether bank concentration substitutes for good legal protection of creditor 
and property rights to reduce conflicts of interest between banks and firms, we interact 
CONC with RIGHTS and with CREDITORS in Table 7. 
                                                                                                                                               
6 While Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Fama and French (2002) obtain results that are consistent 
with the predominance of the POT in the US, Flannery and Rangan (2006) suggest the TOT is more valid. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) and Leary and Roberts (2005) obtain evidence that supports both theories. 
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The coefficients of CONCxRIGHTS in columns (1) and (2) are not statistically 
significant, suggesting that the positive influence of protection of property rights on 
equity issues is independent of bank concentration. Columns (3) and (4) show negative 
coefficients for the interaction term CONCxCREDITORS. This means that the higher 
the bank concentration, the lower the positive effect of creditor protection on firm 
leverage. This result is consistent with our hypothesis H.4, suggesting that bank 
concentration substitutes for strong protection of creditor rights to reduce information 
asymmetries and agency costs between shareholders and debtholders; that is, bank 
concentration is an alternative for facilitating access to debt in countries with weak 
protection of creditor rights. This effect is also economically significant. For instance, 
using the coefficients in column (4) of Table 7, a one standard deviation increase in 
bank concentration (19.09) would cause a reduction in the positive influence of legal 
protection on leverage which represents 0.317 times the standard deviation of the long-
term debt ratio. 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
B. Variation across countries of firm-level determinants of leverage 
Differences in bank market concentration and institutional characteristics in a country 
that affect firm-level determinants of leverage might explain differences across 
countries in the predominance of the trade-off theory versus pecking order theory. We 
analyze this possibility by including interaction terms between each country variable 
(bank concentration, property rights, and creditor rights) and the firm-level determinants 
of capital structure. Results are reported in Table 8. 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
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The positive coefficient of PPE in column (1) is consistent with the idea that asset 
tangibility mitigates the agency cost of debt, as suggested by the TOT. The negative 
coefficients for CONCxPPE, however, indicate that higher market concentration makes 
asset tangibility less important in gaining access to debt. That is, close relationships 
between banks and borrowers resulting from high bank concentration may make debt 
more available to firms with intangible assets by reducing the agency costs associated 
with the use of that debt. This result suggests that asset tangibility and bank market 
concentration are substitutes for reducing the agency cost of debt and that bank 
concentration makes the TOT less valid. 
Column (2) reports the results of interactions between RIGHTS and firm-level 
determinants of leverage. Coefficients of the interaction terms are consistent with the 
prediction in H.2 because they suggest that the TOT becomes more valid with the 
protection of property rights. The positive coefficients on RIGHTSxPROFIT and 
RIGHTSxPPE indicate that greater protection of property rights increases the positive 
effects of profitability and asset tangibility on firm access to debt suggested by the TOT. 
This means that in poorer institutional environments it is more difficult for all firms, 
regardless of their profits and tangible assets, to solve the moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems associated with private transactions. These higher agency costs and 
information asymmetries make it more difficult for firms in poor institutional 
environments to obtain external funds, and the POT propositions are more valid. 
Coefficients of the interaction of CREDITORS with PROFIT, GROWTH, and PPE in 
column (3) are not statistically significant. As CREDITORS maintains the positive 
coefficient observed in all the previous estimates, our results suggest that creditor 
protection has a positive effect on the level of debt but does not affect firm-level 
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determinants of leverage or the relative importance of the TOT and POT for explaining 
capital structure. 
Column (4) confirms that results do not change when we simultaneously include in the 
regression all the interaction terms found to be statistically significant in previous 
estimations. 
V. Robustness 
In further analysis we check the robustness of the results. First, we replicate estimations 
using as the dependent variable total market leverage defined as the ratio of long- and 
short-term debt and the market value of assets. The results reported in Table 9 confirm 
most of the findings so far using long-term debt. Column (2) shows that leverage 
declines with the protection of property rights and increases with the protection of 
creditor rights. Columns (4) and (5) indicate that bank concentration substitutes for 
creditor protection and asset tangibility, and the TOT propositions are more valid in 
stronger institutional environments. The positive effect of bank concentration on long-
term debt is observed only in countries with lower protection of creditor rights when we 
use total debt. The results for total debt should be treated with caution, however, 
because m2 rejects in four estimations the null hypothesis of the absence of second-order 
serial correlation in the first-difference residuals.  
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
Second, we control for the potential endogeneity of bank concentration and institutional 
country variables. Instead of the observed values of each country variable, we use 
instruments for them to identify their exogenous component and to control for potential 
simultaneity bias. The instruments used, following Barth et al. (2004), are: legal origin 
dummy variables (English, French, German, and Scandinavian), latitudinal distance 
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from the equator, and religious composition dummy variables. Religious composition is 
measured as the percentage of the population in each country that is Roman Catholic, 
Protestant, Muslim, or “other.” Results do not change. 
Third, we check that results do not change when we use different proxies for legal and 
institutional variables. Results do not change when both RIGHTS and CREDITORS are 
multiplied by the law and order index of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
to more specifically incorporate differences in law enforcement across countries. 
Another alternative to the measure of property rights is the Index of Economic Freedom 
published by the Heritage Foundation. Economic freedom is defined as the absence of 
government coercion or constraints on the production, distribution, or consumption of 
goods and services beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain 
liberty itself. The index comprises ten categories of economic freedom: trade policy, 
fiscal burden of government, government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, 
capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property 
rights, regulation, and informal market activity. Results using this index are not 
significantly different from those reported using the property rights index. 
VI. Conclusions 
We conclude that bank concentration and institutions affect capital structure and firm-
level determinants of leverage in a study using a panel database of 12,049 firms in 39 
countries during the period from 1995 to 2004. Bank market concentration expands 
firms’ access to long-term debt, as relationship banking serves to mitigate information 
asymmetries and agency costs between banks and debtors.  
Our results also confirm that the protection of creditor rights facilitates the use of long-
term debt by firms; stronger protection of property rights promotes the issue of equity 
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and reduces leverage ratios. Bank market concentration can substitute for the legal 
protection of creditor rights and the tangibility of firms’ assets to reduce the agency cost 
of debt. So, the weaker the protection of creditors in a country and the more intangible 
firms’ assets, the greater the positive marginal effects of bank concentration on firm 
debt. This result implies that bank concentration, the protection of creditor rights, and 
asset tangibility are alternative mechanisms for facilitating access to debt for firms. 
Finally, we provide arguments to explain the variation across countries in the 
applicability of the trade-off and pecking order theories. As bank concentration and 
institutional country characteristics modify agency costs and information asymmetries 
between firms and banks, the firm-level determinants of leverage also vary across 
countries. Results indicate that weaker protection of property rights increases the agency 
cost of external funds, leading to preferences for the use of internal funds as proposed 
by the POT, while the TOT propositions are more valid in countries with stronger 
protection of property rights.  
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